The War of the Pacific broke out on February l4th, 1879, when Chilean troops landed in the Bolivian harbor of Antofagasta. It is clear from the evidence presented in previous chapters that Chile entertained annexation ambitions towards this Bolivian territory since 1842. The Chilean government had already decided on military occupation of the territory by the end of 1878. In January 1879 the Chilean newspapers were inciting an already belligerent public opinion by proclaiming the need to use armed force in order to solve Chile's dispute with Bolivia.

Studies on the War of the Pacific divide this event into four main stages. The first one comprises the occupation of the Bolivian littoral. The second corresponds to the naval war between the Peruvian and Chilean fleets. The third includes the occupation of the southernmost Peruvian provinces. And the fourth is the invasion of the Peruvian heartland, including the port of Callao and the city of Lima.

There is a large number of books written about this war, and in addition, several American researchers have studied the role played by the United States during this conflict. (1) However, some little known aspects of this conflict are studied in this chapter which are particularly important for Bolivia. Nonetheless, one should not overlook the fact that because of this war Bolivia lost an entire province, which covered approximately 62,000 square miles; almost equivalent in size to Pennsylvania. lt. also lost part of its population that radicated there, whose descendants later became Chilean citizens. In addition, Bolivia was deprived of important fiscal revenue as well as valuable natural resources. Worst of 'al], Bolivia became landlocked since Chile took over its littoral, which included 187 miles of shore, four main ports and seven coves.


Information sent to Washington on the Chilean Invasion

The American minister in Lima, Mr. Gibbs, sent information to the State Department on February 10, 1879, about the imminent Chilean invasion of Bolivia and stated that Peru would probably be involved in the conflict. In a later message, Mr. Gibbs confirmed the invasion of Antofagasta and analyzed the legal and historical status of the territories claimed both by Chile and ]3olivia. In his message he added that the foreign minister of Bolivia, Mr. Serapio Reyes Ortiz, had arrived in Lima in order to ask for compliance of the Alliance Treaty of 1873. Mr. Gibbs noted his belief that Chile was a country with larger financial resources, able to defend with case the occupied seashore area, and probably to have it annexed in case of Peruvian nonintervention. Furthermore, he considered that Bolivia did not have much to lose because the commercial saltpeter beds in that area were quite far from the country's urban centers, and in addition, were isolated by the Andean range where mountain passes were narrow and dangerous. He added that President Prado closest circles feared that dispatching Peruvian troops from Lima to the south would probably make that capital an easy prey of Mr. Pierola, a Peruvian politician accused of subversion. (2)

The American envoy accredited to the Chilean government, Mr. Thomas Osborn, informed his government in a note dated 20 February 20, 1879, that Chile was again involved in a border dispute, this time against Bolivia for the Pacific shoreline area lying between 23 degrees and 25 degrees latitude. In his note Mr. Osborn describes the Treaty of 1866 and the changes to that treaty introduced In 1874. He said that the discovery of vast saltpeter beds in the area of Mejillones had awakened the interest of several commercial enterprises on their exploitation. The American representative pointed out that this business was becoming a monopoly under a corporation know as "Compaņia de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta" (Antofagasta's Saltpeter Refiner and Railroad Company) and added that wealthy Chilean citizens had a majority interest in this corporation. (3)

Subsequently, the American envoy sent information about the break of diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru and of the war declaration of April l5th; he further verified that Chile had established a blockade of Iquique’s harbor and was preparing to land troops in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca, just north of the Bolivian border. He mentioned that Tarapaca had inexhaustible deposits of guano and saltpeter. Therefore, in case of military success Chile would certainly retain that province, as a prominent citizen of that country had informed him because of Chilean interest in such deposits valued more than $400'@illion. (4)

Mr. Gibbs sent independent dispatches from Lima containing official Bolivian documents about the Battle of Calama and reporting Chile's declaration of war to Peru. (5) At the same time, Mr. Osborn was sending information from Santiago about the occupation of the ports of Cobija and Tocopilla by Chilean naval. forces and on the occupation of Calama by other Chilean units after stubborn Bolivian stand and numerous casualties. He said that e surviving Bolivian soldiers from Calama were taken prisoners d added that Chile's major concern was Peru. (6)


Chile’s Expansionist Policies and Minister Pettis’ Mediation

The new American minister, Mr. Newton Pettis, arrived in Bolivia early in June 1879 without clear instructions from his government but with a sincere interest in contributing to the restoration of peace n South America. The minister of foreign affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Pedro J. de Guerra, asked Mr. Pettis for American peace mediation directed to get back the occupied Bolivian territory. Mr. Pettis ceded to the Bolivian request and opened talks with his colleagues in Lima and Santiago to explore the feasibility of a US mediation before the governments of Peru and Chile. Minister Pettis traveled later on to Arica and Pisagua for an interview with the presidents of Peru and Bolivia, and continued then on his way to Santiago to have talks with the president and the minister of foreign affairs of Chile. After his return from the Chilean capital, Minister Pettis met the presidents of the allied countries again and gave them an aide-memoire containing a description of his efforts. Pettis informed that Chile would only accept the US arbitration with a guarantee for the possession of Antofagasta. On their part Chile would then pay a sum in compensation to Bolivia for their territory. On the other hand, who accepted arbitration only concerning the question of Bolivia, stressing that the situation with Peru was a different matter that prevented Chile from accepting any mediation on this respect in the near future. (7)

Even though Mr. Pettis failed in his mission, it was obvious that the government of Chile, in spite of accepting arbitration, did not feel secure on its right over the Bolivian coastal territories, and thus demanded as a precondition that in case of losing the arbitration proceedings, the relevant tribunal should have set an amount for reparations that Chile would then pay Bolivia in order to obtain ratification of its possession of the disputed territory. In other words. Chile considered irreversible the annexation of the coastal territories. Its future interest in Tarapaca was unquestionable as well, and their only problem, therefore was to find a way of granting Bolivia access to the sea while validating the Chilean occupation of the territories usurped to Bolivia and Peru.


American Mediation: Peace Talks on the Lackawanna

After Chile's military victories in Tacna and Arica and at a time when Chilean troops were preparing to march on Lima, Minister Osborn took the initiative to offer the good offices of the American government to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict of the Pacific' Chile accepted such initiative and so did the allied countries some time later. Their representatives met with the three American ministers in October 1880 on board of the ship Lackawanna, then anchored in Arica's harbor.

There were three meetings on October 22, 25 and 27, 1980. During the first meeting, once the greetings and the introductory proceedings were over, the delegation of Chile introduced seven basic conditions for peace. They were: first, the transfer to Chile of the territories of Antofagasta and Tarapaca second, the payment of 20 million gold pesos compensation to Chile, of which 4 million would be in cash; third, the restoration of Chilean properties nationalized in Peru and Bolivia; fourth, the return to Chile of the transport vessel Rimac; fifth, the abrogation of the Secret Alliance Treaty between Peru and Bolivia; sixth, the retention by Chile of the territories of Moquegua, Tacna and Arica until all previous conditions were satisfied; and seventh, the formal commitment on the part of Peru not to mount artillery batteries In Arica's harbor once returned by Chile and to limit that port to commercial use only.

At the second meeting, Mr. Antonio Arenas of Peru rejected the Chilean demands because his country did not recognize the right of anyone to rule through military occupation; otherwise that would amount to set a very dangerous precedent for the Americas. The representative of Chile, Mr. Eulogio Altamirano, answered with a statement on how painful it had been for his country to go to war, but stressing that they did so without regard for the amount of sacrifice involved and eager to achieve a solid peace that would enable the reparation of such sacrifices. He added that modern history was fraught with cases of border rectification, and in the case of the so-called Chilean conquest, the only territories involved were those made productive by Chilean toil and capital which by itself made the shift of the border line unavoidable.

The representative of Bolivia, Mr. Mariano Baptista, maintained that the statement of Mr. Altamirano precluded any peaceful solution. He expressed his country's absolute solidarity with the Peruvian position and firmly rejected the principle of territorial annexation by the force of arms, no matter whether it was called a shift forward, a transfer, an acquisition or a conquest. He finally suggested a search, with the help of American representatives, for a framework of the debate that would give way to other conciliatory moves.

The other Peruvian representative, Mr. Aurelio Garcia, submitted among other things the need that arbitration be undertaken by the United States, in view of the good will expressed by the American envoys and on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine.

The representatives of Chile, Mr. Lillo and Mr. Vergara, refused to accept the arbitration proposal, arguing that such a move would have been acceptable before the war but not after. Mr. Lillo added that Chile accepted the ideals of Pan American brotherhood advanced by Mr. Baptista, and accordingly, Chile did not accept the right of conquest either. Nevertheless, he wanted it to be understood that this country required a just compensation for the effort spent in the tragic conflict started for the protection of the Chilean population that brought progress to the disputed regions. Juan Carrillo of Bolivia refuted these arguments and recalled that international arbitration was legitimate. , He joined Baptista in accepting on behalf of Bolivia that Chile may keep its troops of occupation in place until the arbitration tribunal found a solution to all related problems.

Minister Osborn took up from there and made clear that the US government did not seek to become an arbiter in the controversy but that the American government would undoubtedly assume this responsibility in answer to a petition duly endorsed by the three countries. The Chilean envoy then affirmed that he regretted to decline arbitration, particularly in view of the US government's willingness to accept it.

In the course of the third session, the representative of Chile expounded that they were unable to make changes to the peace proposals introduced in the first session. The Peruvian representatives stated as well that they had no new proposals, and once they had advanced the possibility of arbitration, the Chilean rejection had taken the burden of responsibility for the war from the shoulders of Peru, who was just looking for peace with decorum. The representatives of Bolivia reiterated how clear this question was for them -- the allied countries did not accept Chilean conditions and Chile rejected the arbitration proposal advanced by the allies. Furthermore, the proposal of Bolivia for accepting a provisional Chilean administration of the occupied territories that would allow Chile to recover its war expenses was also denied. They deplored thus the lack of agreement resulting from the American mediation. Mr. Osborn lamented on behalf of the three American diplomats their failure to achieve conciliation and peace during that session and stated that he anticipated a very negative reaction from the government and the people of the United States as a consequence of such a failure. (8)

The collapse of the Lackawanna talks had negative repercussions in the three countries and also in public opinion throughout the continent. Ambassador Osborn was admonished by the secretary of state for his failure to promote arbitration as a solution for peace. The ministers of foreign affairs of Chile, Peru and Bolivia issued circulars explaining the position adopted by their respective chanceries in view of the collapse of negotiations on the Lackawanna. It is interesting to note that the Chilean circular attempted to explain the seven conditions set in their original proposal. With regard to the seventh condition, Chile pointed out that the Port of Arica was the natural commercial outlet for Bolivian products and that Chile demanded Peruvian demilitarization of Arica in the interest of defending free Bolivian trade in the area.

Parallel to the Lackawanna talks, Chile tried once again to reach a separate agreement with Bolivia. The Chilean representative, Mr. Eusebio Lillo, proposed an agreement to Mariano Baptista that would have entailed, on the one hand, the final transfer of Antofagasta to Chile: and on the other, the concession of a port further north to Bolivia probably in Moquegua. In that way, Chile would retain Tacna and Arica In payment for war costs. Bolivia declined the alternative to betray its ally and did not accede to separate negotiations. In this regard, the American minister in La Paz sent the following report to Washington:

"The main endeavors of the Chileans in private conferences with the Bolivians, communicated to me confidentially by the latter, were made to break up the alliance between Peru and Bolivia, and engage the latter republic in an alliance with themselves as the unavoidable result of such action. Great inducements were held out, a share in the conquests already and still to be made, but I am pleased to be able to say that such perfidy and disregard of national honor was not consummated; and if, on being consulted on that subject, I took a decided stand in declaring that such proceeding, no matter how beneficial it might be to Bolivia, would be considered by my government, and no doubt by the world, as one of the most infamous transactions in history." (9)


Chile asks for American Intervention in the Matter of the

Exchange of Prisoners

The more outstanding. events of the War of the Pacific have been duly chronicled by many; however, the persistent Bolivian resistance in denying the Chilean army the possibility to conquer more territories in the Altiplano (Andean High Plateau) has been regarded less relevant and is a field of research as yet unexplored.

In this respect it is worthy to note that the government of Chile asked for Minister Osborn's assistance in order that the American government would promote an exchange of prisoners of war arranged by the American envoys in La Paz and Santiago. The Chilean chancellor, Mr. Miguel Luis Amunategui, made reference to several encounters "of little relevance", where Bolivia was able to capture Chilean soldiers. He pointed out that Chile had Bolivian prisoners too, and they would all be exchanged with the cooperation of the United States.

Minister Osborn informed the State Department about the quest and asked for the required official authorization allowing him to intervene in the exchange of prisoners. The Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, sent instructions to the American envoy in La Paz, Charles Adams, asking him to provide his cooperation to Mr. Osborn in the American humanitarian effort aimed to obtain the exchange of prisoners of war. (10)

American efforts for the exchange of prisoners failed after six months of mediation, but in spite of that, the exchange took place subsequently by direct arrangement between the two antagonists.


Bolivian Proposal for Economic Compensation to Chile

American Companies

A few months after the collapse of the Lackawanna talks, the Chilean army succeeded in occupying El Callao, and Lima fell some later. Several peace initiatives were put forward during 1881 d 1882, One of those was undertaken by the first Bolivian minister in Washington, Mr. Ladislao Cabrera, a well known public official who had organized the defense of Calama when the Chilean attacked the place.

In February 1881 Mr. Cabrera introduced his project before the American government for a plan to put an end to the conflict and to the foundation for a peace with honor that could satisfy the expectations of all belligerent nations involved. The Cabrera Plan assumed that territorial conquest was outlawed in South America and that the principle of territorial integrity of nations must be preserved in terms similar to those upheld at the time of independence. This plan foresaw war reparations to Chile by the allied nations, as well as cancellation of other outstanding obligations such as Peru's external debt. On this account, the plan contemplated the formation of a company with American capital's participation that would exploit the saltpeter beds in Tarapaca's Province and in the Bolivian littoral. The American government would be the guarantor for the company's operation, to be managed under the joint authority of the governments of Chile Peru and Bolivia. The company's profit from prospecting operations would serve to pay war reparations to Chile and other expenses aforementioned. This plan did not have a time limit but it did estimate allied war reparations to Chile in Lbs.4,500,000. Minister Cabrera estimated in that amount the annual income from the sale of guano and saltpeter obtained in the occupied territories, and thus the proposed company might pay the Peruvian debt and the cost of the War - after commissions and operating expenses -within a three-year period. The secretary of state, Mr. William M. Evarts, acknowledged receipt of Cabrera's proposal but warned him that no official decision would be forthcoming because of the proximity of a change of government in the US.(11)

Minister Cabrera then insisted on his proposal in May 1881 before the new secretary of state, Mr. James G. Blaine, and made clear to him the Bolivian interest in having the United States play an important role to achieve honorable peace in the conflict being waged in the Pacific, thus side-stepping a possible intervention of such powers as France, England, Italy and Holland, which were at the time expressing their interest in mediation with the belligerent countries.

Secretary Blaine did not pay much attention to this proposal as presented by Mr. Cabrera, but decided as a matter of the highest priority to attain peace in the region, hoping to get a leading role for the United States in peace negotiations and in the future of the occupied territories. (12)


Preserving American Hegemony:

The Secretary of State, Mr. James G. Blaine

The new American government presided by James Garfield took office in March 1881 and appointed Mr. James G. Blaine as secretary of state. This government official had a bright future on the American political stage and had a Panamericanistic scope that gave him an understanding of the need for promoting common goals among all nations in this hemisphere, on the basis of respect for their rights and of solidarity among all of them. In addition, he was interested in preserving American hegemony over the region by denying European powers to exert their influence there. He further believed that on account of prestige and brotherhood, the United States should play an important role in the restoration of harmony among the belligerents in the South Pacific.

Mr. Blaine deeply resented the fact that England could benefit from a situation that legitimately belonged to the United States, since he believed that England was backing Chile in order to absorb, through the latter, the whole Peruvian guano and nitrate business. Secretary Blaine emphasized to American journalists the fact that the iron-clads furnished by England allowed Chile to destroy the Peruvian navy. He also predicted that business in the occupied territories by Chile would be furnished by money from English cargoes. Blaine's forecast proved to be a reality scarcely eight years later, when British interests swept away the gains of guano and saltpeter mining, while Chile kept merely the territories for itself. (13)

Mr. Blaine was concerned that in such ongoing controversies as those between Mexico and Guatemala or between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, territorial conquest by the force of arms might become an established principle. Nevertheless, James Blaine was pragmatic enough to understand that the Chilean occupation and power in the South Pacific was a fact accompli. The United States of America therefore had no other choice but to accept that Chile had acquired certain privileges stemming from military victory, such as the payment of compensation, which might include territorial annexation as part of the cost. In other words, Mr. Blaine was prepared to establish a qualitative distinction in the annexation of Antofagasta and Tarapaca to Chile taking it as payment for debts pending but not as spoils of war and conquest.

Mr. Blaine deeply resented the constant arrogance of Chilean officials in explaining their participation in the war and in expressing their demands for peace. Secretary Blaine asserted many times that he would not have allowed failure in the Lackawanna negotiations. In order to achieve peace he sent new envoys to the belligerent countries followed by a special mission composed of Mr. William Trescot and his own son, Mr. Walker Blaine, who was at the time third secretary of the State Department.

President Garfield was mortally wounded in an assassination attempt a few months after he took office and was replaced by the vice-president, Chester A. Arthur. Mr. Blaine was involved in deep political controversies and was accused, by political rivals and Chilean diplomats accredited in Washington of following a policy in defense of Peru and Bolivia not in the best interests of the United States, but instead in connivance with bond-holders of the Peruvian external debt conspiring for their own benefit. Such a political climate prompted President Arthur to designate a new secretary of state and to yield to a detailed House investigation of these allegations. After careful investigation, the House of Representatives declared unfounded the allegations against Mr. Blaine. This politician would later on take again the functions of secretary of state and promote a new the ideal of a Pan-American union.

Secretary of State Blaine sent new ministers to the capitals of the belligerent nations to try to give new impulse to peace negotiations. Mr. Stephen Hurlbut, in Lima, and Mr. Judson Kilpatrick, in Santiago, attempted respectively but in vain to reach an agreement in which Chile would respect the territorial integrity of Peru and the right of conquest would be rejected. Mr. Blaine's instructions did not specify any provisions referring to the situation of Bolivia and in the territorial dispute, but in La Paz as well as in Lima, Blaine's defense of Peruvian territorial integrity was equated by extension to encompass the Bolivian seashore.

Secretary Blaine was determined to give further momentum to the peace effort in the South Pacific and set up on November 30, 1881, a special mission under William Trescot and Walker Blaine entrusted with the restoration of peace and harmonious coexistence among the three belligerent countries. Mr. Blaine gave the Trescot mission instructions including the following three basic ideas for a renewed American mediation:

"l. To concert such measures as will enable Peru to establish a regular government, and initiate negotiations.

2. To include Chile's consent to such negotiation without cession of territory as a condition precedent.

3. To impress upon Chile that in such negotiation she ought to allow Peru a fair opportunity to provide for reasonable indemnity."

Blaine was also telling Trescot that the American government admitted indeed the right of Chile to expect adequate compensation in payment for war costs. (14) Trescot had instructions to ratify American recognition of Garcia Calderon's government, who was at the time detained in Chile while Lisandro Montero had taken charge provisionally in Arequipa.

On their way south Mr. Trescot and the young Mr. Blaine met in Peru with Charles Adams and left him with instructions to exert his influence upon Bolivian authorities in order to have them stop any possible separate negotiations that they might be conducting with Chile.

Consequently, Minister Adams sent a note to the government of Bolivia in January 1882 on the following terms:

"As the outcome of a meeting I held with Mr. Trescot in El Callao last December 23rd ... I have committed myself to ask Bolivia for a continuation of the present statu quo until the opinion and intentions of Chile could be clearly understood. I have thus the honor to request his excellency's government to avoid the adoption of any conclusive steps before I learn the outcome of negotiations being conducted by Mr. Trescot in Santiago." (15)

The government of Bolivia had sent Mr. Mariano Baptista to take part in the Pan-American Conference convened by Blaine in November 1881 at Panama. The cancellation of that conference played in the hands of Mariano Baptista to open informal talks on his way through Tacna with the Chilean prefect, Mr. Eusebio Lillo, whom he already knew from the Lackawanna talks. Lillo offered a truce to Baptista that would allow Chile to continue its occupation of the Littoral Province, would restore his country's trade with Bolivia and would determine the belligerent's commitment not to renew hostilities without a one-year advance warning.

The Bolivian government took the advice of the American minister in La Paz and reaffirmed that the talks held by Baptista would not be considered seriously because the government of Bolivia maintained absolute loyalty towards the Peruvian government of President Montero. (16)

Trescot's instructions were to support the Peruvian position and to ratify American recognition of the government of Garcia Calderon, then detained in Chile. Coincidental with Trescot's arrival to Santiago, President Arthur appointed a new secretary of state, and such action weakened Blaine's original diplomatic strategy and contributed to promote Chilean intransigence towards Mr. Trescot. In his talk with Trescot, Chile's chancellor, Mr. Balmaceda, reaffirmed Chile's conditions for peace with Peru. One of them consisted of the unconditional cession of Tarapaca, and the other was the continuing occupation of Tacna and Arica as a guarantee for the war reparations demanded.

The newly appointed American secretary of state, Mr. Frederick Frelinghuysen, sent Mr. Trescot new instructions that prompted on February 11, 1882, the signing of the Protocol of Viņa del Mar.

This protocol consisted of the following points:

"l. Cession to Chile of the territory of Peru situated to the south of the Quebrada de Camarones.

2. Occupation of the region of Tacna and Arica for ten years. Peru being obliged to pay twenty million pesos at the expiration of that time.

3. Chile shall occupy the islands of Lobos so long as there shall be guano upon them, and both the net product of the guano taken from them shall be equally divided between Chile and the creditors of Peru."(17)

The Chancellor of Bolivia, Mr. Pedro Jose Zilveti, requested information from Minister Charles Adams about the protocol signed in Viņa del Mar between Chile and the United States, but Mr. Adams claimed ignorance of the text. The Bolivian chancellor subsequently submitted a protest about the absolute disregard shown in the Protocol of Viņa del Mar for the situation with respect to Bolivia, ignoring the concession of his country made to the United States on its mediation by canceling all separate diplomatic initiative with Chile. Thereupon Mr. Trescot sent Walker Blaine to La Paz with an explanation of the talks held with Balmaceda.

Mr. Walker Blaine arrived in La Paz and met immediately with Vice-president Belisario Salinas, Foreign Minister Zilveti and other Bolivian officials, and gave them general information on the Protocol of Viņa del Mar. He was not more specific on account of his instructions to uncover neither details of the talks maintained between Trescot and Balmaceda nor the full scope of the instructions sent by the secretary of state tending for the moment to support Peru on Bolivia's detriment.

Commissioner Walker Blaine sent a long message to Trescot with a report on his negotiations in Bolivia, as well as those held in Peru with the Bolivian envoys, in which he summarized his mission as follows:

"A great deal of importance was apparently attached by the Bolivian government to the protocol signed on the 11th of February last by yourself and Seņor Balmaceda .... should it prove impossible to save her present littoral, and I do not see how this can he done . . . . Bolivia is to be altogether shut out from the Pacific, then the years of Bolivia's existence as an independent nation are few in number."

In another part of his message, Commissioner Blaine considered that:

"the geographic situation of Bolivia required in any case an access to the Pacific," Afterwards he added that it was advisable to consider the need to form an effective confederation between Bolivia and Peru so that Bolivia had access to the sea through Peruvian southern ports, such as "Mollendo and Arica, in order to be able to maintain its national identity…"

In concluding his note, Blaine confided to Trescot his shame on not being able to convey to Zilveti and Carrillo the American government's views, considering above all that Bolivia had great interests at stake. Mr. Blaine suggested that by virtue of American prestige and sense of justice, Bolivia should not be kept waiting and the Americans must determine their position in this respect. (18)

It must be pointed out that on his way through Arequipa to Bolivia, The American envoy, Mr. Walker Blaine, had already advanced to the Bolivia Ambassador Juan Carrillo information about the fact that the Protocol of Viņa del Mar did not mention Bolivia. He rationalized that since the United States was unable to press forward a peace agreement with Peru based on conditions demanded by Chile, there was hardly any need to consider the question of Bolivia, but in case that Peru accepted the Chilean offer, the question of Bolivia would then naturally follow immediately after in the discussions. (19)

Some controversial aspects present in the steps taken by Mr. Hurlbut in Peru and Mr. Kilpatrick in Santiago further weakened the negotiating stance of Trescot's mission. The sudden deaths of Ministers Hurlbut and Kilpatrick further complicated things, and Secretary of State Frelinghuysen then took advantage of those events to declare that former negotiations started by his predecessor were closed. In turn he took a new initiative more favorable to Chile than ever, where he accepted territorial conquest achieved by that country and focused on giving Peru the chance to consolidate a stable government that would be able to negotiate the Chilean peace proposal. Such a scheme did not have a clear position regarding the situation of Bolivia.


The US State Department consents to the Maneuvers of Chile

The War of the Pacific, no matter how far from the United States, became an apple of discord in the US Congress, where many groups started active lobbying in favor of Peruvian bond-holders, Chilean diplomats, and other groups involved. President Arthur appointed new envoys to the three belligerent countries following the advise of Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, and gave them instructions to exert their influence in order to have peace as soon as possible. He sent Mr. Cornelius Logan to Chile, Mr. James Partridge to Peru, and Mr. George Maney to Bolivia. (20)

The secretary of state resumed his instructions in this manner:

"It is understood that Chile is in possession of the littoral province of Bolivia and the Peruvian littoral provinces of Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica. It is not supposed that any contingency can happen which will bring about the permanent occupation and annexation by Chile of any larger part of Peru than this. Your efforts, therefore, must be directed towards securing for Peru as large a part of these provinces in the peace treaty as possible, and as large a money indemnity as possible for whatever territory may be retained by Chile." (21)

On the instructions sent to his minister in Bolivia, George Maney indicated:

"If negotiations offered any opportunity to do so, you could help make provisions procuring that Bolivia take part in them but avoiding to commit ourselves without previous knowledge of the president of the United States." (22)

Minister Logan, who had been previously assigned to Chile and held that country in high esteem, became the most dynamic figure among the three American diplomats and followed the steps of his predecessor, Mr. Osborn, in support of Chile's position, in spite of the relative congeniality felt by the American administration towards Peru.

Mr. Logan did not lose time in meeting President Garcia Calderon in prison and in telling him openly that Peru should not place any hopes in the US mediation and that it would be advisable to give up Tarapaca in favor of Chile. And furthermore, that he should consider the possibility of transferring Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. On the other hand, he spoke with Chilean Chancellor Aldunate and expressed to him the reservations of the American government that prevented it from recommending to the Peruvian government acceptance of the provisions contained in the Protocol of Viņa del Mar.

Mr. Logan summed up the achievements of his initial actions in search for peace in a note sent to the Chilean chancellor that read as follows:

"1. In order to remove the difficulty regarding the sale of Tacna and Arica, I proposed a treaty on the basis of ceding Tarapaca, with a separate article presenting the question of Tacna and Arica, to the Peruvian congress for its own decision, without any recommendation from Seņor Calderon.

2. I proposed to make: the river Azufre the boundary line, giving Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru. This proposal was not accepted by either party.

3. This suggestion came from your excellency's government, and was made into a formal proposal by myself. Chile was to have military occupation of Tacna and Arica for five years, at the end of which time a vote to be taken by the people of the territory to determine whether they would attach it to Chile or Peru. If the vote took the territory to Chile, the latter was to pay Peru $10,000,000 in compensation. Seņor Calderon, however, refused the proposal.

4. I proposed to Seņor Calderon that Chile should have military occupation of Tacna and Arica for ten years, and then evacuate it. He declined this, and it was not presented to your excellency.

5. I proposed to submit the following question to the president of the United States, in the capacity of a friendly arbitrator:

Shall the Chilean government as a measure growing out of the necessities and manner of settlement of the war have the right to purchase the Peruvian territory lying between the river Camarones and the river Sama, for the sum of $9,000,000, with the stipulation that Bolivia shall be given the perpetual right to the free and innocent passage over said territory, with perpetual freedom from export and import duties, upon the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty between the latter republic and the Republic of Chile?

Seņor Calderķn accepted this proposal, but your excellency declined it." (23)

A few weeks later, Mr. Logan personally visited the acting Peruvian president, L. Montero, and advised him to enter into negotiations with Chile. He presented an outline of his actions and reminded the acting president that he should be aware the Bolivian congress approved a resolution in favor of a truce, which would certainly be followed by a peace treaty. Mr. Logan also explained to Mr. Montero that since a separate peace was achieved between Bolivia and Chile, Peru would find itself at a disadvantage for any further negotiations, and therefore he would suggest that Peru accept to sell Tacna and Arica for 10 million dollars, otherwise, Peru might be forced to give them up at a later time without due compensation. (24)

By the end of 1882, President Chester Arthur inserted in His message to Congress the following ideas concerning the American position on the War of the Pacific:

"The war between Peru and Bolivia on the one side and Chile on the other began more than three years ago. On the occupation by Chile in 1880 of all the littoral territory of Bolivia, negotiations for peace were conducted under the direction of the United States. The allies refused to concede any territory, but Chile has since become master of the whole coast of both countries, and of the capital of Peru. A year since, as you have already been advised by correspondence transmitted to you in January last, this government sent a special mission to the belligerent powers to express the hope that Chile would be disposed to accept a money indemnity for the expenses of the war, and to relinquish her demand for a portion of the territory of her antagonist.

This recommendation, which Chile declined to follow, this government did not assume to enforce, nor can it be enforced without resort of measures which would be in keeping neither with the temper of our people nor the spirit of our institutions.

The power of Peru no longer extends over its whole territory, and in the event of our interference to dictate peace would need to be supplemented by the armies and navies of the United States. Such interference would almost inevitable lead to the establishment of a protectorate, a result utterly at odds with our past policy, injurious to our present interest, and full of embarrassments for the future."

President Arthur wrote this part of the presidential message in order to dispel any doubts about a possible American military intervention, so that Peru would understand that the country was standing alone and should accept defeat. Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen sent instructions to Mr. Logan asking him to divulge the substance of President Arthur's message and reminded him that, in evaluating the message, Bolivia should consider itself more fortunate than Peru, since it had merely lost access to the sea in its war with Chile. (25)

For this part, the American envoy in Lima, Mr. James Partridge, approached the Chilean negotiator Novoa and introduced to him the following basic points for peace: First, cession of Tarapaca; second, cession, sale or transfer of Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, but if that proposal were unacceptable, the territories mentioned should remain neutral; third, demilitarization of Arica's port. Partridge's proposal forced Mr. Logan to send a strong note of complaint to Washington; Mr. Frelinghuysen supported him, disavowed the proposals and dismissed Partridge from his post. (26) In addition, reiterated his instructions to Minister Maney in La Paz, asking not to take any initiative and leave all further actions in Logan's hands. (27)

The president prisoner, Mr. Garcia Calderon, complained to Logan about his pro-Chilean leaning and about the way he had incited Bolivia to break the alliance with Peru. Mr. Logan answered that he had not incited Bolivia but reminded Montero that there was a real possibility instead for such an event to happen. Later on President Garcia Calderon pointed out to Mr. Logan that the summary made in his note of October 18, 1882, about the negotiations, contained a false statement where he said that Garcia Calderon would have rejected to cede Arica and Tacna to Bolivia, when in fact, Logan never mentioned this point. Mr. Garcia Calderon, together with other Peruvian personalities, maintained that it was appropriate for Peru to cede Tacna and Arica to Bolivia and that such territorial cession had already been approved by the Peruvian congress itself. Mr. Garcia Calderon made public in that way, and in those days, the position maintained by Peru until today; in other words, that Bolivia's access to the sea through Arica must be a decision adopted by Peru and in no way by Chile. (28)

With Mr. Logan's support, the Chilean negotiators began a peace offensive and promoted with money and weapons the establishment of a Peruvian government under the leadership of Mr. Iglesias. They expected him to accept the peace proposals presented by Chile, or otherwise wanted to use him in a way that would prompt Mr. Montero to enter negotiations and sign the peace proposals as presented. Mr. Novoa succeeded in signing with Mr. Lavalle, a representative of Mr. Iglesias, a first protocol that acknowledged those basic proposals for a peace negotiation, and Mr. Iglesias himself signed it later. Mr. Logan indicated that his own initial proposals to Mr. Garcia Calderon were based on this particular agreement. There was a difference, however because Mr. Logan had suggested that Tacna and Arica would remain under Chilean administration for five years and Mr. Garcia Calderon's stubbornness had only hardened Chile's position, while Mr. Iglesias had accepted that Tacna d Arica remained in Chilean hands for ten years a period which Logan considered long enough for the Chileanization of the territories and their ultimate loss by Peru. (29)

Subsequently, Logan informed about his belief of the existence of an agreement for a separate peace between Chile and Bolivia and concluded that Montero's days as head of his Government were numbered. In addition, Chile canceled its recognition of Mr. Garcia Calderon's government and recommended that the United States give recognition instead to Mr. Iglesias' administration in order to facilitate the peace process, in view of the fact that, after their agreement with Mr. Iglesias, Chilean troops were withdrawing from Northern Peru and their military units were marching towards Arequipa. (30)

The American envoy, Mr. Logan, reported to Mr. Frelinghuysen in June 1883 that the Peruvian Congress, in a meeting convened in Arequipa, had confirmed Mr. Garcia Calderon as president and Mr. Montero as first vice-president. He added that the congress of Peru ratified the protocol signed by Montero with President Campero, in which Peru transferred sovereignty to Bolivia over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, under the provision that Bolivia would maintain its alliance with Peru until the end of the war. Minister Logan viewed this action as a sort of "checkmate" by Montero to Chile, thus preventing Bolivia from signing a separate peace treaty with Chile. (31)

The American minister in Santiago sent to Washington in July 1883 a copy of the peace protocol signed by the government of General Iglesias with the Chilean delegate, Mr. Jovino Novoa, and informed him in the accompanying note that the signing of the protocol caused a great impact on Bolivia, where some public sectors were asking for a separate peace with Chile and for severance of the alliance with Montero. (32)

Meanwhile, the secretary of state in Washington accredited Mr. Seth Phelps as the new American minister in Lima and gave him an outline of the position of the United States in the conflict, as follows:

"The representatives of this government, as you have seen from these instructions, were directed harmoniously to join in a courteous and friendly effort to aid the belligerent powers in reaching an agreement for peace, which, while securing to Chile the legitimate results of success should at the same time not be unduly severe upon Peru and Bolivia.

While greater stress has been given in the instructions of this department to the relations of Peru and Chile, it must not be assumed that the rights and wishes of Bolivia, a sovereign power and a party to the contest, with rights equal to the other contestants, are to be neglected. It is not supposed that any agreement be reached, which shall not receive the assent of that power in all that concerns its interests. As this government has recognized the equal sovereignty of the three republics, and will not depart from that position, of course any agreement, so far as it affects the rights of Bolivia, must receive the consent of that power.

Until Chile and Peru had reached a point where a fair prospect of agreement was seen, it seemed unnecessary to negotiate at La Paz, particularly as Seņor Calderon, it was properly assumed, would not act against the interests of his ally. For these reasons the tentative discussions were carried out at Santiago."

On his arrival in Lima, Phelps observed that General Iglesias did not enjoy a favorable political atmosphere in spite of the determined financial and military support from Chile, and recommended accordingly to let some more time pass before granting American recognition to Iglesias' government. He also asserted that Mr. Montero did not count with enough forces and that Peruvian towns in the heartland were particularly exhausted. (33)

Under such prevailing conditions, the Chilean government maintained the situation under control and it even had the option to choose among the alternatives for peace.

Therefore, General Montero accepted from the Chilean negotiator, Mr. Novoa, the following peace proposals:


"a) Cession of Peruvian Tarapaca to Chile.

b) Cession of Peruvian Tacna and Arica to Bolivia.

c) Payment of war reparations to Chile in the sum of 60 million pesos, half this amount to be paid by Bolivia.

d) Peruvian recognition of its obligation to pay the external debt."

Chilean authorities rejected the plan forwarded by Montero because it would mean that Peru could count on Bolivian loyalty in exchange for Tacna and Arica, two regions that some elements within the Chilean government considered should be reserved for Chile. Those same elements were fully convinced of the need to obtain a final break between Bolivia and Peru.

Consequently, Mr. Novoa received instructions to sign the Peace treaty with Iglesias, based on the protocol formerly signed with Lavalle. Iglesias concerted this way with Chile the Treaty of Ancon on October 20, 1883, in which not only territorial conquest was considered legal but, in addition, a bilateral agreement between Chile and Peru to sanction the permanent confinement of Bolivia was legalized for the first time. On the next day Mr. Phelps sent information about Chile's recognition of Iglesias' government as well as on the signing of Ancon's Treaty. (34)

Minister Logan asked the US secretary of state once more for American recognition of the Peruvian government under Iglesias, this time, with a view to consolidate the Peace Treaty of Ancon. (35)

The secretary of state then sent instructions to Mr. Phelps asking him to foster relations with whoever exerted some form of authority, but maintaining a position of friendship and goodwill towards the Peruvian people that would give time for public opinion to express itself about Iglesias' actions. Furthermore, he told Mr. Phelps that the United States would not take sides in connection with the substantive meaning of the Treaty of Ancon and its protocols before having time enough to examine and study them. (36)

By the end of that year, President Chester Arthur sent his third annual message to congress and referred to the war in South America in the following terms:

"The contest of Bolivia, Chile and Peru has passed from the stage of strategic hostilities to that of negotiation, in which the counsels of this government have been exercised. The demands of Chile for absolute cession of territory have been maintained and accepted by the party of General Iglesias to the extent o Peru's concluding a treaty of peace with the government of Chile."

It should be noted that President Arthur did not make any reference to the situation of Bolivia. (37)

While Iglesia's government was confronting Caceres, Chile occupied Arequipa and the south of Peru in order to put pressure upon Bolivia and force that country to sign an agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

It was essential for American diplomacy to get Chile and Peru to sign a treaty while the situation of Bolivia did not have the relevance to demand a more active intervention of the State Department. In this regard, Mr. Frelinghuysen stated that the War of the Pacific ended with the Treaty of Ancon - the same treaty that contained provisions somewhat different to those formerly considered advisable by the United States. (38)


The Truce of 1884 as a Decoy to divide Bolivia and Peru

Minister Logan informed Secretary of State Frelinghuysen about the request sent by the Bolivian government to the Chilean government through the Spanish ambassador -once Arequipa capitulated and General Montero fled - to allow two Bolivian envoys to visit Santiago in order to begin peace negotiations. With Chile's consent, the vice-president of Bolivia, Mr. Belisario Salinas, and his assistant, Mr. Belisario Boeto, traveled to Santiago in November 1883 with instructions to sign a peace agreement that would include a transfer of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Mr. Logan noted the complexity of the situation because he was aware since his arrival in Santiago that Chile repeatedly had tried to proceed to such a transfer in reciprocity for the acquisition of the Atacama seashore.

Logan observed as well that in the meantime, Chile had not succeeded in convincing Bolivia to sign a separate peace treaty; on the contrary, the Bolivian government constantly advocated to maintain its alliance with the Peruvian faction of President Montero. The American minister considered that as a result of the factor Chile had ignored Bolivia deliberately - once they had their peace with the Peruvian faction of General Iglesias - and was determined, on the other hand, to consolidate absolutely and unconditionally its possession of Tacna and Arica.

Subsequently, Logan asserted that considering the treaty's provision to allow the 10 year occupation of Tacna and Arica, it was impossible at the moment to adopt any decision over those territories. He also had information that Iglesias' government was against the introduction of any changes to those provisions. Therefore, Logan warned that talks between Bolivia and Chile would be very difficult, but noted that, the mobilization of Chilean troops in Tacna - where five thousand men awaited orders to invade Bolivian territory - would certainly force the issue towards reaching some sort of agreement. He also emphasized that having all its ports under occupation, Bolivia found itself in an indefensible position. Consequently, Logan believed that Chile would force peace through a treaty of its own liking, which would undoubtedly isolate Bolivia from all its maritime ports. He added that some members of the Chilean government nevertheless maintained a magnanimous stance towards Bolivia, which would in any case depend upon the posture adopted by the newly arrived Bolivian commissioners.

Logan made reference in the same note to the fact that Montero had rejected the note of November l3t, 1882, intended to promote the partial transference of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia, as well as to Campero's obstinacy to continue his unconditional alliance with Montero. Therefore, Logan considered that the Bolivian president had lost "the maximum desideratum of Bolivia's access to the sea" on which the national being of the country was dependent and which made evident Campero's incompetence and his lack of a distinct understanding of the true national interests of Bolivia.

After all these considerations, Minister Logan concluded his report noting the total blindness of the national leaders of both countries, Montero and Campero, which precluded them from understanding their failure and from listening to impartial advice. In Logan's view, they would be responsible should an unfortunate situation turn into a real calamity for the allied countries. (39)

Some time later, the American minister sent a confidential note to the secretary of state informing him of progress in peace negotiations being held between Bolivia and Chile. Logan reported on his conversation with Chancellor Aldunate, who told him about the peace proposal presented by the Bolivian commissioners on the basis of the cession of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Such a concession was out of the question for the Chilean chancellor because the treaty signed with President Iglesias of Peru prevented it. However, Chile was ready to offer a limitless truce that would allow the resumption of trade and the construction of a railroad from a port of the Bolivian littoral to a given point on the tentative new borders. Chancellor Aldunate mentioned to the American envoy that this offer had been presented in the form of an ultimatum and resulted in its acceptance by Commissioners Salinas and Boeto, but only in principle, because their powers included the signature of a peace treaty and not the signature of a truce; accordingly, they had requested new powers from the Bolivian government.

Minister Logan said that the Chilean counterproposal included payment of reparations to Chile by Bolivia, and this prompted Mr. Aldunate to invite Mr. Logan to be an arbiter on the question of the sum that Bolivia should pay if the success of those talks resulted in a truce agreement. On this account, Logan asked the State Department for instructions, and added that Bolivia would elect a new president and that the question of peace was a very important issue for such election.

In analyzing the situation, Logan indicated that President Campero and his chancellor Quijarro had lost the opportunity to obtain perpetual possession of Tacna and Arica provinces on account of their personal hostility to Chile and of their decision to stake their fate on their loyalty to President Montero of Peru. He added that the Chileans, annoyed by Campero's intransigence, had no other choice but to deal directly with General Iglesias, and thus to close for not less than ten years Bolivian chances of negotiating for the acquisition of Tacna and Arica. Another important point in Logan's commentaries was the sensitivity of Bolivian public opinion against the concept of a railroad that would connect Bolivia to the coast, because of the general belief that such action would open the doors to Chilean immigration and to domination by Chilean capitals.

Such trends could ultimately produce the country's total assimilation by Chile. Further down in his message, Minister Logan expounded the prevailing belief In Bolivian intellectual circles that the nation's existence would be seriously jeopardized if Bolivia could not get a permanent and sovereign access to the sea through Tacna and Arica. He already forecasted, however, that Chile would maintain absolute control over those territories and that Chile would consolidate its entitlement over them once the ten-year time limit, sanctioned by the Treaty of Ancon was over. He further believed that Peru's hands were tied for at least 25 more years.(40)

Early in April 1884, the American envoy, Mr. Phelps, was reporting on his part from Lima to the secretary of state, that he had information leading him to believe that truce negotiations between Chile and Bolivia had failed and that he had learned of large Chilean troop movements in southern Peru for an intent on resuming hostilities against Bolivia. He vouched for Chilean superiority on account of their control of the Mollendo-Puno railroad which allowed them to transport torpedo boats to Puno and use them against Bolivia in the attack that would be launched through Lake Titicaca. Mr. Phelps added that Chile also captured the steamships used for the crossing of the lake and that the situation was secured until Chile could achieve peace with Bolivia. (41)

The US secretary of state sent instructions to the new American minister, Mr. Gibbs, accredited before both the governments of Lima and La Paz, after he weighed Mr. Phelps report. In his instructions, he pointed out US recognition of General lglesia's government and remarked that Mr. Gibbs should do all he could to have Bolivia participate in the peace negotiations that would result from such diplomatic recognition. Mr. Gibbs did not have a chance to carry on those instructions because, in the meantime, negotiations were concluded in Valparaiso. (42)

Facing the threat of renewed hostilities posed by the Chilean troops concentrating in Puno, Tacna, Mollendo and Calama, Bolivia was forced to sign in Valparaiso the Truce Pact of April 4, 1884, accepting the proposals as originally requested by Chile. The provisions of this pact were kept confidential until their approval by the parliaments of both countries, and they were not given to the public until late in 1884.

This chapter is thus intended to show how American diplomatic efforts played contradictory roles that fluctuated with the respective changes taking place in US domestic policy. In general, it could be said that the United States' position favored Peru openly, but that it did not necessarily mean to favor Bolivia, whose interests were normally ignored or forgotten when the major decisions were taken. The fact that their best ministers were subsequently sent to Santiago transformed the initial pro-Peruvian American stance into a subjective pro-Chilean posture that affected mediation results and indeed served to consolidate all claims made by Chile.

Diplomatic correspondence shows that the truce pact was imposed upon Bolivia and that its terms had already been decided by Chile earlier. Although the US played a prevailing role during the negotiations of the Ancon Treaty, it did not take part in the talks leading to the truce between Chile and Bolivia. The latter became totally isolated while maintaining its loyalty to President Montero's

Peru. Moreover, Iglesias' Peru ignored Bolivian loyalty, and in fact buried the alliance. For Minister Logan, the position of Chile was clear and the confinement of Bolivia was already decided in the treaty of 1883. The truce pact was no more than a decoy to divide Bolivia and Peru, thus saving time to consolidate the Chileanization of Arica. That pact already contained all of the main provisions that would find their corollary in the 1904 Treaty and their coda in the 1929 treaty and protocols.

The War of the Pacific had three main outcomes. First it allowed Chile's conquest of the Bolivian seacoast and the Peruvian Tarapaca. The exploitation of the nitrate and other mineral riches of these provinces would allow Chile to play a semiperipheral role in the region. Second, it left the provinces of Arica and Tacna under Chile's occupation with a final decision over them to he made at a later date. At the same time this gave the US a formal role to play in any settlement. Third, the new status of Bolivia as a land-locked country created a conflictive situation, which would endure and shape regional relations as well as it would influence somehow the US performance as the hegemonic power in the Americas.

The US role in this conflict was controversial and gave room for resentment in Chile, Peru and Bolivia. Although that role did not interfere with the rising of the US as a hegemonic power, it was mostly Great Britain, a declining power, that profited most. While British diplomacy did not accrue any gains with this war, British private interest cleverly monopolized all nitrate riches from the Bolivian Littoral and Tarapaca.



1. Herbert Millington, American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific. New York, Octagon Books; 1975. Richard S. Phillips Junior, "Bolivia and the War of the Pacific. 1879-1884," Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia. 1973. Mason, T.B.M., War on the Pacific Coast of South America Washington D. C. 1883. Burr, Robert N., By Reason or Force. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. Ireland, Gordon, Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in South America., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938. Talbott, Robert Dean, A History of the Chilean Borders.

2. Dispatches, Peru, Note 304 and 31 1, Pichard Gibbs to William Evarts, Lima, February 10, 19, 1879.

3. Dispatches, Chile, Note 83, Thomas Osborn to William M. Evarts, Santiago, February 20, 1879.

4. Dispatches, Chile, Notes 88 and 89, Thomas Osborn to William Evarts, April 4-10, 1879.

5. Dispatches, Peru, Notes 314, 316, 317, 323 and 326. Richard Gibbs to William Evarts. Lima, February 26;,March 5, 12 and 26; and April 2, 1879.

6. Dispatches, Chile, Note 86, Thomas Osborn to William Evarts, Santiago, April 3. 1879.

7. Dispatches, Bolivia. Note 22, Newton Pettis to William Evarts, August 23, 1879.

8. Dispatches, Peru, Note 200, A. Christiancy to William Evarts, Lima November 2, 1880. Dispatches, Bolivia. Note 46, Charles Adams to William Evarts, La Paz, November 17, 1880.

9. Dispatches, Bolivia, Note 39, Charles Adams to Williams Evarts, La Paz, November 17, 1880.

10. Dispatches, Chile, Notes 132 to 165. Thomas Osborn to William Evarts. Santiago, February 27, September 13, 1880. Instructions, Note 3, William Evarts to Charles Adams, Washington, DC., April 19, 1880.

11. Diplomatic correspondence, Washington D.C., Ladislao Cabrera to William Evarts, February 18, 1881, and William Evarts to Ladislao Cabrera, Washington, D.C., May 5, 1880.

12. Diplomatic correspondence. Ladislao Cabrera to James Blaine. Washington, D.C., May 9, 1881.

13. Blaine's interviews by the New York Herald, April 27 and June 30, 1882. Cited by Enrique Amayo, British Policy in the War of the Pacific, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia, 1879-1884., Ph.D. Diss. University of Pittsburgh, 1985.

14. Instructions, James Blaine to William Trescot, Washington, D.C., December 1, 1881.

15. Dispatches, Bolivia, Charles Adams to J.P. Zilveti. La Paz, January 10, 1882.

16. Dispatches, Bolivia, J.P. Zilveti to Charles Adams, La Paz, February 2, 1882.

17. Dispatches, Chile, Note 13, William Trescot to F. Frelinghuysen, Viņa del Mar, May 4, 1882.

18. Dispatches, Peru, Note 4, Walker Blaine to W. Trescot. Lima, May 8, 1882.

19. Dispatches, Peru, Note 1, Walker Blaine to W. Trescot. Arequipa, March 28, 1882. Instructions, Note 12, F. Frelinghuysen to C. Logan,, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1882.

20. The House of Representatives made an inquiry on the Peruvian bonds and the behavior of American congressmen regarding this matter. See Congress report on Chile and Peru, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1882. Report 1790, 47th Congress. Session l.

21. Instructions, Note 3, F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1882.

22. Instructions, Note 3, F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1882.

23. Dispatches, Chile, Note 15, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen. Santiago, October 18, 1882.

24. Dispatches, Chile, C. Logan to Lizardo Montero, Santiago, November 13, 1882.

25. Instructions, Note 41, F. Frelinghuysen to C. Logan, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1883.

26. Instructions, Note 47. F. Frelinghuysen to G. Maney, Washington, D.C., February 10, 1883.

28. Francisco Garcia Calderon, Mediacion de los Estados Unidos de Norte America en la Guerra del Pacifico, el seņor doctor don Cornelius A. Logan y el Dr. Don Francisco Garcia Calderon Buenos Aires, 1884. Letters, Garcia Calderon to Logan, January 11 and December 21, 1883.

29. Dispatches, Chile, Note 92, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, May 9, 1883.

30. Dispatches, Chile, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Note 93 of May 9 and telegram dated May 2, 1883.

31. Dispatches, Chile, Note 104, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, June 18, 1883.

32. Dispatches, Chile. Note 113, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen. Santiago, July 2nd, 1883.

34. Dispatches, Peru, Telegram and Note 18, S. Phelps to F. Frelinghuysen. Lima, October 21 and 23, 1883.

35. Dispatches, Chile, Note 146, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, November 1, 1883. Also, Dispatches, Peru. Note 32,S. Phelps to F. Frelighuysen, Lima, November 15, 1883.

36. Instructions, Note 18, F. Frelinghuysen to S. Phelps, Washington, D.C., November 15, 1883.

37. Quoted by Herbert Millington, op. cit. p. 139.

38. Op. cit. p. 140.

39. Dispatches, Chile, Note 158, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, November 30, 1883.

40. Dispatches, Chile, Note 160, C. Logan to F. Frelinghuysen, Santiago, December 19, 1883.

41. Dispatches, Peru, Notes 83 and 86, S. Phelps to F. Frelinghuysen, April 8 and 11, 1884.

42. Instructions, Note 1, F. Frelinghuysen to R. Gibbs, Washington, May 19, 1884.

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