The signing of the Treaty of 1929 between Chile and Peru, including the clause of the complementary protocol that imposed the participation and previous agreement of the two old belligerents in any negotiation's with Bolivia, paralyzed the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at that time was unable to display an adequate strategy to immediately address the ministries of foreign relations of Santiago and Lima. Also, it could not undertake any negotiations for consideration by the United States, since the Department of State had conditioned its participation to the stipulation that Bolivia should first solve its dispute over the Chaco with Paraguay.

Regretfully, Bolivia and Paraguay could not find a diplomatic solution to their disagreements, and the War of the Chaco (1932-1935) totally dispelled a possibility of agreement between these two countries. The search for and consolidation of peace with Paraguay demanded the greatest diplomatic efforts from Bolivia during a large part of the 1930s. Similarly, the dislocation of the national institutions produced by the effects of the war profoundly shook the bases of the socio-political structure of the country, and all national efforts concentrated on the search for a solution to the internal problems. (1)

Bolivian diplomacy was conscious of the importance of the maritime question, and started to delineate two different approaches to face the problem. One, lead by Ostria Gutierrez, supported a friendly approach to Chile, and wanted to obtain the understanding of the latter’s government for Bolivian needs. The other, of which Tomás Elío was an outstanding leader, assumed that Bolivia had to resort to the United States to pressure Chile to cede a portuary exit to Bolivia, since it was felt that Chile would not accept any solution predicated only on a friendly and direct approach. (2)

In 1943, the American government invited President Enrique Peñaranda to visit Washington in order to discuss matters of common interest to both countries. The Bolivian government decided to use this occasion not only to analyze the economic problems emanating from its cooperation with the United States and the Allied Nations during the war, (through the sale of rubber and tin at very low and frozen prices), but also to enable the Bolivian authorities to present to the United States the problem of their confinement and to try to find possible American cooperation in finding a solution.

President Peñaranda initiated the meeting with some formal declarations with regard to the friendship that Bolivia had always professed to the people and the government of the United States and then gave the floor to Foreign Minister Elío to present the issues that Bolivia considered important. Minister Elío presented first the problem of Bolivia's confinement and the need for Bolivia to have access to the Pacific Ocean through a sovereign port of exit. Minister Elío emphasized the fact that the portuary question was a problem that adversely affected relations between Bolivia and Chile, and that it could also affect indirectly Bolivia’s relations with Peru. Finally. Elío urged President Roosevelt and the government of the United States to demonstrate a friendly interest in the search of a solution that would do justice to the Bolivian cause.

President Roosevelt replied that he and the undersecretary of state, Mr. Welles, during the last ten years had discussed this problem many times, and that they were sympathetic towards the Bolivian cause. Undersecretary of state Welles reminisced that it had been more than 25 years back that he first exchanged views on this matter with President Roosevelt.

Roosevelt said that he considered that the Bolivian maritime problem should be presented at the highest possible level, cognizant of the high moral implications it had. The American president, who had advocated the good neighbor policy towards the Americas, said that he thought it was not appropriate for Bolivia to search for a solution through the legal channels before international organizations such as the Court of the Hague. Roosevelt believed it was possible and necessary to reach a direct understanding with Chile, and perhaps also to find understanding from Peru.

Subsequently, they continued to discuss matters regarding the port of Arica, and the Bolivian foreign minister made some appreciation on this port and the close economic relation between Arica and Bolivia. In referring to the strategic importance of certain city-ports such as Arica and Trieste, Roosevelt stated what was perhaps the most important point of the whole meeting. He said that Trieste, even though a territory under the sovereignty of Italy at that time, served as a port to many other nations or national entities such as Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Croatia and Serbia, and he affirmed that it was not fair that one country alone should control this type of port. He believed that it was necessary to develop the idea that these ports - should be controlled by a responsible administration under management of some form of international authority, which would exercise a kind of tutelage in benefit of all its users. President Peñaranda and Minister Elío expressed their thanks for the interest, knowledge and sympathy demonstrated by President Roosevelt with regard to this problem. The conversation concluded with the opinion expressed by undersecretary Welles in the sense that Chile seemed to show some favorable signs that would allow a satisfactory agreement which would benefit Bolivia; this belief was also shared by Mr. Guatemala, Bolivian ambassador in Washington. The Bolivian delegation returned to La Paz extremely satisfied with the results of the interview between both leaders. (3)

The optimistic spirit of the Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, shared by Ambassador Luis Fernando Guachalla, led the latter to present to the American government a memorandum expressing the Bolivian position, which could also serve as a base to substantiate the "favorable indications" that Undersecretary Welles seemed to have detected in Chilean officials.

Secretary Cordell Hull gave a copy of this memorandum to the Chilean foreign minister, Fernández. The secretary of state, unhappily for Bolivia, did not have either the experience nor the interest in participating in the search for a solution to the maritime problem. Cordell Hull completed this mission coldly and without enthusiasm. He limited his role to that of a simple messenger; he did not try to use this procedure as a base or initial step in obtaining a workable approach between Bolivia and Chile under sponsorship of the United States.

Under these circumstances, the reply from Chile was not unexpected. The memorandum that Chile presented to the government in Washington read as follows:

The Department of State decided once more to ignore any responsibility concerning the Bolivian request and merely served as a courier delivering a message to Chile. With this feeble action, the US diplomacy left Chile at that moment free of any obligation to show good will and understanding to solve Bolivia's confinement.

The preparations for the Conference of San Francisco that would establish the United Nations gave the American authorities the opportunity to deal with the Bolivian maritime problem, in relating to the revision of the international treaties.

The four powers: United States, Great Britain, China and

the Soviet Union created a preparatory commission which

designed a proposal for an international organization that would guarantee and promote world peace and establish the necessary safeguards to avoid its failure, as was the case of the League of Nations. The proposal presented by the four powers, was approved in Dumbarton Oaks and was circulated to the allied countries, who were convened to the Conference of San Francisco. The proposal of Dumbarton Oaks did not contain any provision for the revision of treaties, a juridical principle which had been included previously in the covenant of the League of Nations. Some countries, most of which were subject to unequal treaties, were interested in the fact that the United Nations charter contemplated a provision that would allow treaty revisions. Consequently, these countries decided that the treaty revision principle should be included in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal.

During the month of April, the American delegation debated this case internally, US Senator Arthur Vandenberg was in agreement, as long as the revision of treaties did not affect the position or the interests of the United States. He maintained, however, that the revision of treaties was the moral base of the new international law, since it would permit the removal of injustices imposed by previous treaties that did not necessarily guarantee international order and, moreover, gave rise to risky situations. Vandenberg was able to obtain approval of this principle, which he presented for

consideration to the American president in a memorandum dated April 19, 1945. This principle was later known as the Vandenberg Amendment and was approved by the four powers in a meeting on the May 2, 1945 with the modification that it did not mention the word "treaties" due to Soviet opposition, but instead granted power to the General Assembly to recommend peaceful solutions to any situation, without regard for its origin. For Vandenberg, this implied by inference the revision of previous unjust treaties. (5)

The Vandenberg Amendment as approved by the four powers was intensely and passionately debated. The Chilean delegation actively opposed this amendment and stipulated that the charter should establish the principle of respect for the irreversible nature of previous treaties. The position of the delegations of Bolivia and Chile reflected the problem of Bolivia’s geographic confinement and this was made explicit in many of their interventions.

Mr. Vandenberg, who maintained his amendment partly because of Poland, understood also the Bolivian case and therefore believed that this country should return to the Pacific Ocean through negotiations, which might take place as a result of his amendment. The Vandenberg Amendment finally became Article 14 of the Charter of the United Nations. (6)

The well known Bolivian diplomat, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, was sent to Santiago in 1947 as ambassador to the government of Chile, and was authorized to initiate long negotiations with President González Videla and his various foreign ministers. Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez accomplished the official adoption by President González Videla of a favorable position and compensation to the Bolivian cause. Ambassador Ostria reported to La Paz:

The conversations took place in some detail, within a general frame of principles, in order to explore concrete ways for finding a solution.

In his memoirs, President González Videla granted himself the exclusive responsibility of adopting a new policy with regard to Bolivia which was consistent with his government's programs. The Chilean president emphasized that the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its relations with Bolivia, had avoided the real problem: an exit to the ocean for Bolivia that would take into account the interests that Chile and Bolivia had in common. In this sense, González Videla accepted the Bolivian demand to satisfy the portuary needs presented to him by "the distinguished diplomat Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez." (8)

For Chile, said González Videla, the conciliatory formula contemplated:

The Chilean envoy and Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez believed that the United States would facilitated the financial resources needed to execute the portuary works for Bolivia and the economic projects for the integration into the bordering regions of the north of Chile and the adjacent Bolivian areas, which had to be completed as part of the compensation that Bolivia had to contribute in exchange for its sovereign exit to the ocean.

In the eyes of American authorities of that period, President González Videla was held in high esteem and considered as one of the most capable leaders of Latin America. This encouraged President Truman to officially invite him to visit the United States. The Chilean statesman visited Washington at the beginning of spring in 1950 and held discussions with Truman on many subjects. Included was the possibility of a cession of a corridor granted by Chile to Bolivia without any territorial compensation but, with economic compensation based on the use of the waters of the lakes of the Altiplano to irrigate the north of Chile and to obtain energy. He added that the support of the United States would be necessary for the completion of these important projects, and that the support of the United States would be needed for Peru to give its consent in agreement with the complementary protocol of 1929. President Truman congratulated the Chilean president for his initiative and discussed on a map the details of a possible solution. He finally committed all the American support necessary for the success of this project. Secretary of state Dean Acheson also showed his support and sympathy to the presentation made by González Videla. (10)

Upon his return to Santiago during the month of May, the

Chilean president held an interview with Ostria Gutiérrez and discussed with him the details of the much sought after solution. On June 1st, the Bolivian ambassador presented a note to formalize the progress of conversations started three years earlier.

The government of Chile replied on June 20th with a note transcribing the concepts of the Bolivian letter. It stated that Chile was moved by a fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia and was willing to enter formally into a direct negotiation to seek a formula that would conform, effectively, to their common interests and would make it possible to give Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, as well as for Chile to obtain compensations that did not have a territorial nature.

Ercilla, a Chilean magazine, published a very famous chronicle relating the supposed details of the arrangement between Bolivia and Chile and the role of the United States in providing the funds and technology for projects to be executed. International press gave ample coverage to this problem and its possible solution. Some groups and individuals in Bolivia and Chile opposed the details or the substance of a solution to the problem, and organized strong campaigns to make this arrangement fail during the negotiations.

President Truman delivered the inaugural speech of the Fourth Meeting of Consultations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, which took place in Washington in March 1951, saying he was happy to think about a project that had been discussed with the Chilean President.

It was with regard to the deviation of the waters proceeding from the lakes that are between Bolivia and Peru, to irrigate the west coast of South America, from Peru to Chile, and in exchange of that, to give to Bolivia a port on the Pacific. (11)

Truman’s speech caused much surprise, and there were many who believed that the American president had a mediators role, The degree of surprise was greater in Peru, which neither Chile nor Bolivia had officially notified of any agreement, since the basis of this supposed arrangement had not yet been established. Peruvian President Manuel Odría issued the following declaration, reminding that:

With these declarations, public opinion in Chile, Bolivia and Peru was disturbed and the governments of Chile and Bolivia were subject to strong criticism from their political adversaries. In consequence, both governments decided to wait before resuming their negotiations. These negotiations, under Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez, were never completed and did not culminate in a concrete solution, constituting until this date the most important concession that Bolivia was able to obtain from a Chilean government since 1904.

President Truman never lost his enthusiasm over an access to the sea for Bolivia and had a new opportunity to reiterate his enthusiasm, when the new Bolivian ambassador Victor Andrade and an old friend of Truman, presented his letters of credence in August 1952, President Truman left his seat at the near conclusion of the meeting and went to the globe and found Bolivia, and facing Ambassador Andrade, made a reference to the visit from Chilean President González Videla. Truman said he had reiterated the critical necessity for Bolivia to obtain free access to the ocean and that this problem could not be ignored, and that it should be resolved through peaceful means. Similarly, Truman referred to the compensations requested by González Videla, and with particular vehemence, said, "Victor, I’m really enthusiastic about the project! I wish you could use these waters to create soil as rich as California's in the north of Chile and at the same time give Bolivia free access to the sea." (13)

During 1951, the Department of State prepared and approved some basic foreign policy documents which would serve as a frame of reference to shape United States diplomacy with the nations of the hemisphere. These documents, classified at that time as "secret and confidential," made explicit reference to the relations between Bolivia, Chile and Peru; and at the same time, noted the maritime problem and the solution proposed by González Videla.

The diagnosis made about Bolivia and its relations with the neighboring countries, concluded, "Claiming to have lost territory to each of its five neighbors, Bolivia is naturally suspicious and distrustful of others, and it is somewhat surprising that its relations with its neighbors are as good as they are. This is true especially in the case of Chile, Bolivia's traditional enemy since the loss of its littoral in the War of the Pacific .... The dream of eventual access to the sea has motivated much of Bolivia’s foreign policy and has kept alive the resentment against Chile." (14)

Lines later, the diplomatic document referred to the American position with regard to this matter:

The Department of State thus showed its relative support for Bolivia, ignoring the enthusiasm that Truman had expressed, and leaving all responsibility, as stated before, to the good will of Chile. The document on Bolivia also ignored notes exchanged between Bolivia and Chile in 1950.

In these negotiations President Truman gave all his support to Bolivia, not only because of the justice of the cause of its maritime claim requirements, but also because he was very well impressed by President González Videla, who convinced him that Chile was supportive of the solution. President Truman acted alone, in spite of the fact that the Department of State was not enthusiastic about intervening. The lack of American diplomatic action that would implement the desires of President Truman, as well as his isolated declarations, paradoxically contributed to a standstill in the search of a solution to a problem that he wanted so much to solve. In fact, the failure of these negotiations could be attributed to the governments of Chile and Bolivia which did not know how to handle their public opinions nor how to coordinate an approach to Peru. In addition, Mr. Truman’s imprudence in openly speaking on a very sensitive and complex issue had also contributed to revitalizing this attempt at solving Bolivia’s confinement.

The revolution of 1952 In Bolivia opened a process of very important transformations, and between 1952 and 1964 the government devoted much attention to the creation of bases for solid economic development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policies were oriented towards development and the demands of maritime reintegration were temporarily set aside.

In 1960, however, the difficulties in the execution of programs and the moderate economic growth of Bolivia showed the local authorities that several obstacles to further development originated in Bolivia’s dependence on Chilean ports, as well as in the lack of an adequate system of free transit.

Relations between Bolivia and Chile were further aggravated by the dispute between the two countries over the use by Chile of the waters of the international river Lauca. Bolivia felt the ecology of the already arid Bolivian zone would be damaged the subsistence of numerous groups of aymara farmers populating the region for many centuries would be adversely affected. This dispute was not solved and Bolivia broke diplomatic relations with Chile and took the case to the Inter-American system. This organization showed once more its inefficiency by not solving the Bolivian problem, not even suggesting any type of settlement. The United States played a passive role in this dispute. This passivity brought about failure in part, since the OAS was designed to function mainly when the United States saw its own interests affected. During this time, the Bolivian government did not receive active support from the Department of State with regard to the maritime problem. The only case which constituted an exceptional declaration of American Ambassador Ben Stephansky. expressed in 1962 the following to the press in La Paz:

In August 1963, the Department of State decided to mediate between Bolivia and Chile so that both countries would re-establish relations and peacefully solve their differences. The American Ambassador in La Paz made the initial contacts and realized the extent to which the government of Bolivia wished to renew relations with the government of Chile. However, he saw the need to hold simultaneous conversations for the purpose of finding a solution to the portuary problem. (16) The government of Chile refused both the Bolivian proposal and the American mediation. Afraid to hurt the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations, the United States did not insist and considered its efforts concluded.

On the occasion of the visit of President Paz Estenssoro to President Kennedy in October 1963, the Bolivian President emphasized to his American colleague during a private meeting the problems faced by the Bolivian people, due in part to the geographic confinement to which it had been reduced by a war and an unjust treaty.

Kennedy understood the problem and questioned Paz Estenssoro about the possible alternatives to solve the Bolivia confinement. He also referred to the problem indirectly and in a very diplomatic way during the toast at the luncheon offered in his honor by the Bolivian President Paz Estenssoro on October 23rd.

The Department of State’s position of non-intervention regarding the problem between Bolivia and Chile was firmly maintained on this occasion. However, President Kennedy agreed to sign with Paz Estenssoro a "Joint Declaration" that incorporated the case of the Chamizal as an example, which without directly mentioning Chile, was addressed to that country. The Chamizal is a territory that the United States returned to Mexico under Kennedy. (17)

Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, the Puerto Rican coordinator the for "Alliance for Progress" in 1963, was impressed by the Bolivian geographic confinement and the poor relations existing between Bolivia and Chile, and decided to present the problem to the "Committee of the Nine Wise Men of the Alliance," within the context of the development of the geographic area delimited by the bordering region of the south of Peru, north of Chile and the Bolivian "Altiplano."

The development program was based on the production of cheap electric energy and the irrigation of arid regions of the north of Chile and the south of Peru with the waters of Lake Titicaca. In exchange for this, Bolivia would receive a sovereign corridor to the Pacific Ocean where it would be able to construct a modern port and other works financed by Inter-American organizations.

This formula was called "The Moscoso Proposal" and in reality, it was a modified review of the solution previously presented by Chilean President González Videla to President Truman. (18)

In April 1967 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, the countries of the Western Hemisphere organized a summit of presidents and chiefs of state in order to discuss economic problems that affected the development of their economies. While it did not promote the meeting, the United States supported it by giving President Johnson an opportunity to convey his interest in the region. Hemispheric as well as world opinion was that the American government, after Kennedy, had forgotten Latin America.

The foreign ministers met in February 1967 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to discuss the preparatory agenda for the summit; this agenda was prepared initially by a committee comprised of the foreign ministers of Chile, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. The items in the agenda included six points, all related to socio-economic aspects of development. René Barrientos Ortuño, Bolivia’s constitutional president, requested that the nations of the American Hemisphere consider at the meeting the maritime confinement of Bolivia and the burden this posed for the country’s economy. The request was presented first to the foreign ministers’ preparatory committee and then at the Conference of Foreign Ministers. The foreign ministers of Bolivia and Chile, accordingly, moved behind the scenes as well as officially.

On February 22nd, the conference approved the items on the agenda including the six points presented by the preparatory committee, but it did not include the case of Bolivia’s confinement. President Barrientos therefore announced that Bolivia would not attend the summit.

Barrientos considered this refusal a farce, since the American foreign ministers did not wish to discuss the core of the major obstacle to Bolivia’s development: its confinement. Consequently, it was announced officially that President Barrientos would not attend the Conclave of Punta del Este.

Since the absence of the Bolivian President in Uruguay would diminish the importance of the meeting, the United States tried to influence Barrientos and convince him to change his mind. The American ambassador in La Paz visited the president many times, but to no avail.

The undersecretary of state for Latin American affairs, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, arrived in La Paz on February 28th expressly to emphasize the importance of the summit and President Johnson’s wish to meet with all the leaders of the continent to discuss matters of multilateral interest.

He said that the problem of Bolivia’s confinement was a bilateral problem between Bolivia and Chile, and that perhaps at Punta del Este, Barrientos would be able to start dealing with this problem with President Frei. He also said that the United States would support the inclusion of Bolivia’s confinement in the agenda if other countries of the region accepted this. However, the important point for Mr. Gordon was that the meeting was directed mainly to concentrate on problems that affected all the countries of the region, and that President Johnson wished to deal with these in the presence of all heads of state of the countries of the region. President Barrientos was firm in his decision and told the undersecretary of state that Bolivia’s empty seat should remind the Latin American countries that Bolivian geographic confinement had originated in an unjust war, which Bolivia had not provoked and which had plundered it’s maritime littoral, which was a disgrace for the continent it would only disappear the day when Bolivia returned to the Pacific coast. For this process he needed the solidarity of all countries of the hemisphere. (19)

President Johnson attended the meeting at Punta del Este, and discussed and analyzed the problems of the hemisphere with almost all Heads of State of the region. Barrientos’ absence was the dramatic gesture by which Bolivia was calling attention to the problem of its confinement. The meeting was important, for American policy at the time, to project its approach to the Latin American countries so that they might face their socio-economic problems In association with the United States. The priority lay in diminishing importance of the revolutionary model that Castro was imposing in Cuba. For the Department of State, the Bolivian maritime confinement was not a problem of ideological confrontation nor the object of hegemonic struggle between the great powers, and therefore it did not require any action that would contradict the government of Chile. President Johnson did not understand Bolivia’s maritime problem, since he had neither Roosevelt’s continental perspective nor Truman’s humanistic vision. To summarize this period within the context of American diplomacy, the solution to Bolivia’s confinement was not an important issue, and consequently, it was best for the United States to maintain a low profile.

Since April 1962, diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile remained suspended. Therefore, the governments of Frei and Siles Salinas decided in 1969 to elevate the status conferred upon their consulates in Santiago and La Paz. Consequently, the consul general would be a high level official who would be able to solve the many day-to-day problems resulting from the lack of diplomatic relations. In this way, Chile appointed Ambassador Carlos Mardones in La Paz and Bolivia appointed Ambassador Franz Ruck Uriburu to Santiago, both as consul generals. (20) Ruck was assigned the difficult task to reiterate, once again, the Bolivian maritime problem to the authorities in Chile. The instructions were maintained and reiterated under the governments of Presidents Obando and Torres. Ruck was not able to reach any understanding with the government of Frei.

In 1970, the new government of Chile under President Salvador Allende demonstrated an Americanist spirit and accepted the suggestions made by Ruck. The Bolivian diplomat described the new Chilean Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, as: "the Chilean that in my judgment, was the most receptive to our legitimate aspirations, the most sincere negotiator and a true friend to Bolivia." (21)

The actions taken by Ruck to secure "a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean," allowed him to reach preliminary agreements that contemplated a territorial corridor, a port, an enclave, and the exclusive use of a dock in Arica. These arrangements were presented again and confirmed in a reserved meeting between the Bolivian foreign minister Huascar Taborga and the Chilean foreign minister Clodomiro Almeyda, which took place in San José, Costa Rica. (22)

A few days later on May 21, 1971, in his first message to Congress, President Allende reaffirmed this position, saying:

At the end of 1971, the new government of Bolivia, headed by General Hugo Banzer, undertook new initiatives before the government of Allende for the purpose of finding a solution to the Bolivian confinement. These consultations were made in New York and Montevideo and continued in Lima with the participation of the Representatives to the Andean Group, and later during meetings that took place in Santiago and in Lima between the Bolivian foreign minister Mario Gutiérrez and the Chilean Foreign Minister, Orlando Letelier, in April 1973. Consequently, it was decided that a high-level political meeting should take place in Cochabamba in October 1973 to try to find a definitive solution to the problems between both countries. However, the political events in Chile, with the fall of President Allende in September 1973, did not allow any agreement to be reached.

The following year, in March 1974, during the inaugural ceremonies of the new president of Brazil, General Ernesto Geisel, a meeting between presidents Hugo Banzer from Bolivia and Augusto Pinochet from Chile took place under Brazilian sponsorship.

In 1975 President Banzer re-established diplomatic relations with Chile and presented the latter with an aide-memoire containing seven points, amongst which the following may be noted:

With much reluctance, but under pressure by Banzer, who took the maritime problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the government of Chile finally agreed to deal with the Bolivian government regarding the cession of an outlet to the sea. The Chilean reply, made public December 19, 1975, specified the following conditions:

Furthermore, the letter provided geographic details of the territory offered by Chile to Bolivia, and established the conditions subject to a simultaneous exchange of territories. The formula of a territorial enclave would be disregarded. In addition, the letter described the operational modalities and other points of interest regarding the Chilean-Bolivian relations.

In agreement with the first article of the complementary protocol of the Treaty of 1929, the government of Chile consulted with the government of Peru on this proposal. Peru replied proposing to hold discussions on the subject. On the one hand, the conversations between Chile and Peru took a long time, and on the other, Bolivia and Chile could not reach an agreement regarding the so-called salient points of the negotiations which referred to some aspects presented by Chile as the conditions of barter of territories, which the Bolivian government and public opinion did not accept it.

Chile accepted some modifications, with the exception of the point referring to the territorial exchange, which it considered the basis for any negotiation. Additionally, Chile said that Bolivia, by accepting the negotiation "globally," had implicitly accepted the exchange of territories. Bolivia, in turn, interpreted that "globally" meant to continue negotiating in search for a solution to the landlocked situation of the country, through the corridor, but that it did not imply a specific agreement to Chile’s note, since the idea of polishing the salient points pre-supposed modification and clarification of the issues presented.

Later, a number of meetings were held between the Bolivian and Chilean representatives while President Banzer and Pinochet exchanged letters. The negotiations between Bolivia and Chile, already deteriorated by the disagreements relating to the main points within the negotiations agenda, were complicated even more when the government of Peru replied to the Chilean consultation on the lines of Article One of the complementary protocol of 1929.

The Peruvian reply reflected Peru’s desire to contribute with its own ideas and different modalities to the solution of Bolivia’s confinement:

The preceding condition constituted the fundamental base of the presentation made by Peru, and was complemented by the conditions indicated below:

Chile declined to consider the Peruvian note since it implied an attempt to revise the Treaty of 1929, and it neither agreed to nor opposed the cession of a corridor to Bolivia. Peru, in turn, believed that the Chilean proposal for a corridor did imply a revision of the Treaty of 1929, and considered their reply not only adequate, but also a basis for further discussion.

Because of Chilean refusal to find a solution to the impasse resulting from the consultations with Peru and Chile’s denial to withdraw the condition of territorial exchange, President Banzer broke diplomatic relations with Chile on March 17, 1978, reaffirming that Chile did not comply as it should have to the spirit of friendship and fraternity, sought when diplomatic relations were restored three years earlier.(27)

During Pinochet’s government, relations between Chile and Peru had notably deteriorated, despite many official denials concerning the unusual arms race in that area. For the first time, the Soviet Union had begun to provide arms to a country in the region, Peru.

The commemoration of the centennial of the War of the Pacific which affected Bolivia, Peru and Chile, together with the freezing of the Chilean-Peruvian relations rose the interest of the Department of State. In 1973 it prepared a report entitled "The Legacy of the War of the Pacific", which contained a summary of the historical events and of the persisting problems as well and its possible repercussions. (28)

The Organization of American States celebrated the l5Oth anniversary of Bolivia's independence, and on this occasion, the United States supported with its vote a declaration, which was the first explicit reference made by the nations of the hemisphere regarding the confinement problem.

The text of the declaration established that:

Despite this political statement, the Department of State continued with its traditional attitude, ignoring the Bolivian maritime problem when possible. This was evident for example, during the spring of 1976, on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by Bolivian Ambassador Alberto Crespo Gutiérrez to President Ford. The ambassador called attention to the difficulties which the landlocked situation created for Bolivia, and to "the potentially conflictive situation amongst some countries of the Pacific and the need of concluding this tension through a solution to the Bolivian maritime problem on the bases already discussed by President Banzer, in order to reach peace, development and integration in the Southern Cone." President Ford replied to Ambassador Crespo in this ceremony in a very general way, stating that his government: "sympathizes and understands the Bolivian aspirations, and that the United States, with the other republics of the hemisphere, would find a positive contribution to achieve a fairer, most peaceful and most successful world order." (30)

Once it was known that Chile had officially agreed to solve the Bolivian maritime problem, the United States finally gave it’s support through Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who saw in this not only a solution to the problem of the Bolivian confinement, but most important, the fact that Bolivia would serve as a wedge between Chile and Peru, especially when Peru had entered a stage of proximity to the Soviet Union, and at a time when the United States did not feel sympathy for the so called "Peruvian revolution."

The new position adopted by the United States was confirmed by the joint declaration that was signed in Santa Cruz by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Bolivian foreign minister, which established in the pertinent chapter, that:

President Carter assumed a clearer and more defined position on the landlocked status of Bolivia. Carter - a politician with a deep humanistic sense and of strong convictions in guiding his policies - adopted a favorable position towards the Bolivian cause which continued throughout his period in office. This evolution was parallel to the developments in the negotiations between Chile and Bolivia, as well as diplomatic events between the United States and Latin American countries.

During early September 1977, President Carter signed in Washington in the presence of all the presidents of Latin America, the new treaties with Panama, which included the return of the Canal and its adjacent zones to the Republic of Panama. On this occasion, President Carter met individually with the presidents of the hemisphere and used these occasions to present to Peru an Chile the Bolivian maritime question.

Days later, Carter was also visited by Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez, and at the conclusion of the interview, President Carter explained to the press that:

President Carter, as stated above, identified the problem as one of a tripartite nature and supported direct negotiations between the interested parties as the appropriate means of reaching a solution. The dealings regarding this problem between Bolivia and Chile were terminated, therefore also terminating the conversations between Chile and Peru. President Carter offered alternative solutions, while confirming the importance that his government attached to the Bolivian maritime problem. President Carter surprised many when he personally made reference to this subject during his speech at the opening of the Eighth General Assembly of the Organization of the American States:

Once again, the support to the Bolivian cause was expressed during the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, in La Paz, Bolivia at the end of October 1979. The Bolivian government had previously requested the OAS to include in the agenda an item concerning Bolivia’s confinement, and this was achieved during the Ninth General Assembly. The United States voted in favor, despite the opposing opinion of the Chilean ambassador, who had stated that it was not an attribute of the OAS to deal with this type of problems. (34)

The change in position of the United States regarding Bolivia’s confinement, together with the favorable support given by other countries of the American continent coincided with a historic moment during the Ninth Assembly of the OAS. The enacted resolution making reference to Bolivia's maritime problem, established in a dynamic and flexible way a new doctrine in Inter-American international law. The text pointed out:

At the inauguration of the tenth ordinary period of sessions of the OAS, almost at the end of his term, Jimmy Carter broadened his aspirations for the future of the hemisphere. He also referred to the Bolivian maritime problem, which he hoped would be resolved during this decade and under a spirit of justice and cooperation. (36)

President Carter’s ethical approach to foreign affairs probably could explain his interest in solving Bolivia’s confinement, as he became one of the American mandatories who was most interested in it. His favorable attitude served as a good precedent for subsequent American diplomacy, as a favorable position towards the Bolivian maritime cause continued during the Reagan administration.

Bolivian Ambassador Julio Sanjines Goytia, when presenting his letters of credence to President Reagan in 1982, referred to various points of interest, including the maritime problem. In this regard, he said:

President Reagan replied:

American diplomacy has continued to understand the Bolivian maritime cause as a problem in the hemisphere, and has shown preoccupation by the potential implications. In this regard, Ambassador N. Shaw Smith, State Department's director of affairs for the Southern Cone, at an "International Politics Forum" on Latin America sponsored by the University of Georgetown and the Washington Office for Latin America, said, "The existence of old disputes that remain without solution are a potential danger for the countries in the region, especially the United States ... The Bolivian claim for a territorial access to the sea through Chile has been debated again at the Organization of the American States...and deserves the interest of the United States in its policy for the Southern Cone." In another section of his document, the American diplomat pointed out that the United States policy objectives in the region were to maintain peace and prevent the opening of hostilities as well as to keep the Soviet Union out of these regional conflicts. (38)

As a result of the 1983 OAS General Assembly in Washington, the President of Colombia, Mr. Belisario Betancur invited the ministers of foreign affairs of Chile and Bolivia to meet in Bogota in order to agree on formulas that would facilitate bilateral understandings between both countries.

During 1984, several preparatory contacts were established in order to convene on the goals of the scheduled meeting. In those preliminary contacts, it was determined that the procedures and stages for the Chilean-Bolivian conversations would be set in Bogota. However, once the Government of Bolivia announced the call for presidential elections, the Chilean delegation to the OAS announced in February of 1985, that its Government no longer recognized the OAS competence over this dispute and that it would only meet with Bolivia on a bilateral basis. (39)

The new Bolivian Foreign Minister, Guillermo Bedregal, approached the Chilean Foreign Minister and held several meetings during 1986. In the OAS Assembly held in Guatemala in November, it was announced by Chile and Bolivia Foreign Ministers, that they had decided to meet in Montevideo, Uruguay to seek formulas directed towards solving the problems between both countries, particularly the confinement of Bolivia.

In keeping with the resolutions of the OAS, Bolivia in 1987, presented a proposal for the solution of the conflict to the Government of Chile as the basis for negotiations. Those direct negotiations between the two states took place in Montevideo in April of that year under auspices of the Uruguayan Government. Unfortunately, that basis for an understanding of mutual benefit, which would have opened up prospects and good possibilities of integration, peace and development, was rejected by President Pinochet, to the surprise even of the Chilean people, thus cutting off the negotiations.

Because of the hostile Chilean Government’s behavior, the Bolivian Government called for a meeting of the OAS's Permanent Council. In that meeting, the Permanent Representative of the US, Ambassador Richard T. Mc Cormack stated:

A few months later, the OAS General Assembly passed a new resolution, including the favorable vote of the US on Bolivia's maritime problem deploring Chile’s attitude and calling on both governments to reinitiate negotiations directed to solve the land-locked status of Bolivia through the provision of a sovereign and useful outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

For this reason, the newly appointed Bolivian Ambassador to the White House, Mr. Carlos Delius addressed the President of the United States, on April 8, 1988:

President Reagan in his reply once more reiterated US Government support for Bolivian quest for a sea’s exit:

Bolivian diplomacy finally achieved the support from the US in its claim for a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, through direct negotiation between the involved parties - Bolivia, Chile and Peru - within the framework of the OAS. The American diplomatic shift can be explained as follows: On the one hand, President Carter had emphasized that justice be one of the foundations of relations between countries of the hemisphere. On the other hand, the US feared a potential Soviet interference in the maritime question. Nevertheless, the US support given in the OAS meetings did not include an active participation of American diplomacy in the settlement, although Carter left a door open for such a possibility. President Reagan reaffirmed the interest of the United States in reaching a solution to the Bolivian maritime question, within the framework of the OAS.

Bolivia’s success in having the countries of the region finally declare that its landlocked status was a problem with hemispheric dimension together with the US fear that this problem could potentially contribute to an East-West confrontation created a new situation which could lead to a final settlement for Bolivia's confinement.

This chapter concludes that the long quest of Bolivia for an outlet to the sea has finally succeeded in gaining the attention of all nations of the hemisphere, which have recommended a solution to a problem that they regard as relevant to all.

During the Secretary of State’s Official Visit to Bolivia in August 1988, Foreign Minister Guillermo Bedregal took the opportunity to discuss the maritime problem and presented a Memorandum to the Head of the American diplomacy on this matter. Bedregal explained Bolivia’s perception of the maritime problem and suggested that Washington play a more active role in resolving this difficult conflict. The Secretary of State, George Schultz, manifested his interest and stated that he would see to it that the State Department further study this issue. However a few months later, the change of administrations in both the United States and Bolivia put an end to this measure.(43)

Ambassador Jorge Crespo Velasco presented his letters of credence to President George Bush on December 20, 1989. On this occasion, Ambassador Crespo manifested to the President of the United States in his speech:

A few years later and in the same manner, Andrés Petricevic at the ceremony of presenting his letters of credence to President William J. Clinton on December 9^th., 1993 affirmed:

A year later, during Vice-president Al Gore’s visit to Bolivia in March of 1994, his Bolivian counterpart explained Bolivia’s maritime problem to him. This United States Vice-president showed his government’s favorable disposition towards initiating a dialogue with Chile that would reach, through consensus and cooperation, comprehensive solutions, benefits for both countries and favor regional integration. Vice-president Gore was interested in this issue, which is reflected in the Joint Communiqué that both vice-presidents subscribed (46).

It is within this context that Ambassador Fernando Alvaro Cossío presented his letters of credence as Bolivian Ambassador to President Clinton on February 6^th, 1996. In his speech he refers to the maritime problem in the following manner:

3. US Foreign Relations, File 824.001

5. Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter and the Role of the United States 1940-1945., Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, 1958 pp. 758-776; and Arthur H. Vandenberg,, Jr. (Ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952, pp.172-190.

9. Gabriel González Videla: op. cit. p. 895.

10. Gabriel González Videla: op. cit. p. 902.

13. Víctor Andrade, op. cit. pp. 207 and 208.

15. See Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

29. OEA/See. G.CP. doc. 468/75.

30. US State Department: Remarks.

35. OEA/Ser. P-AG/CG/Acta 78, October 26, 1979.

36. OEA/Ser. P-AG/Acta 143/80 corr., November 19, 1980.

44. Remarks of Ambassador Jorge Crespo Velasco, Washington DC. December 20^th.1989.

45. Remarks of Ambassador Andrés Petricevic, Washington DC. December 9^th.1993.

46. Joint Declaration by the Vice-presidents from Bolivia and the USA, Santa Cruz, March 20^th. 1994.

47. Remarks of Ambassador Fernando Cossío, Washington DC. February 6^th.1996.